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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE EARL CRAGUN, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20040822-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from sentencing after he pleaded guilty to three counts of 
obtaining a prescription under false pretenses, a third degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 
concurrent terms of zero-to-five years for each of his convictions, to be 
served consecutive to his sentences in another case ? 
Defendant's appellate counsel filed his brief accompanied by a motion to 
withdraw, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Consequently, this 
Court must make a "full examination of all the proceedings" and decide whether the 
appeal is "wholly frivolous." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 
170 (Utah 1981). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 22, 2004, defendant was charged by information with seven counts of 
obtaining a prescription under false pretenses, a third degree felony (R. 1-3). On May 6, 
2004, defendant waived his preliminary hearing and entered guilty pleas to three of the 
seven original counts (R. 11-12, 14-19; R. 36:2-9). In return, the State agreed to dismiss 
the remaining four counts (R. 11-12, 14-19; R. 36:2). 
On June 3, 2004, defendant appeared for sentencing (R. 21-22, 34; R. 36:9-11). 
The presentence investigation report prepared for the hearing apparently recommended 
that defendant be sentenced to prison (R. 36:11).1 Upon defendant's request, the trial 
court continued sentencing and ordered a diagnostic evaluation (R. 34; R. 36:10). The 
diagnostic evaluation apparently recommended probation (R. 36:11).2 
On August 19, 2004, defendant appeared for sentencing in this case and in another 
case on which he had been on felony probation at the time he committed the current 
offenses (R. 36:12). The State asked the trial court to follow the recommendation of the 
]The presentence investigation report is not part of the record on appeal. 
2The diagnostic evaluation is not part of the record on appeal. 
2 
presentence investigation report (R. 36:12). Defendant asked the court to follow the 
recommendation of the diagnostic evaluation (R. 36:12-13). 
Before announcing sentence, the trial court noted that "Mr. Cragun and I have 
been here numerous times on these cases" and that the court "had an opportunity to 
review" the presentence investigation report and the diagnostic report (R. 36:13). The 
court then rejected defendant's request, ordering defendant to serve three concurrent 
terms of zero-to-five years on the current charges, to be served consecutively to 
concurrent terms of zero-to-five years on the prior charges for which he had been on 
felony probation, "with credit for time served" (R. 26; R. 36:13). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 27). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On or about January 21, 2004 and February 11, 2004, defendant, after receiving 
pain medication from one doctor, "went to other doctors and obtained pain medications 
without telling the other doctors that he was already under a doctor's care receiving 
medication" (R. 36:5). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief asserting that defendant's 
challenge to his sentence is frivolous. The State agrees that defendant's claim has no 
basis in the law. 
3
 This Statement of Facts is taken from the factual basis for defendant's plea 
offered at defendant's plea hearing. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON RATHER THAN 
GRANTING HIM PROBATION 
On appeal, defendant challenges "the trial court's decision to send him to prison." 
Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief in connection with 
that claim, conceding that "[considering that the Defendant had been on felony probation 
when these offenses were committed and that he had had a prior probation violation for 
which the trial court didn't send him to prison for, it is impossible to say that the trial 
court abused its discretion and was 'inherently unfair' in its sentencing of the Defendant." 
Aplt. Br. at 9. The State agrees with appellate counsel's conclusion. 
"The sentencing judge 'has broad discretion in imposing [a] sentence within the 
statutory scope provided by the legislature,'" State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, ^ 3, 
73 P.3d 991 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991)). Thus, this 
Court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the 
judge failed to consider 'all the legally relevant factors,' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 
649, 651 (Utah App. 1997), or 'the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to 
constitute abuse of discretion.' Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051." Id. An "'appellate court can 
properly find abuse [of discretion] only if it can be said that no reasonable person would 
take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^ 6, 82 P.3d 
211. 
4 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to prison in this 
case. First, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004), provides that a person convicted 
of a third degree felony "may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term . . . 
not to exceed five years." Defendant's terms do not exceed that limit. 
Second, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004) gives the court discretion to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences "if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense." Moreover, the record here shows that, before making that 
decision, the court properly considered "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
[and] the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(2); see also R. 36:13. 
Under such circumstances, "it can[not] be said that no reasonable person would" 
impose the sentence imposed by the trial court. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^ 6 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The State therefore agrees with defendant's appellate counsel that defendant's 
challenge to his sentences is without basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the argument advanced by defendant is frivolous and because defense 
counsel has complied with the mandates of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), 
5 
and State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 304, 13 P.3d 1056 (per curiam), this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction and sentence, and grant his counsel's motion to withdraw. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED J_ April 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah, Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNPK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on 0_ April 2005,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Dee W. Smith, The 
Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County, 2550 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, Attorney for Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM A 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 . Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
§ 76-3—401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
